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Environmental Law
by W. Scott Laseter*

and
Chintan K. Amin**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps following broader legal trends, the Eleventh Circuit's environmental law decisions in this survey period suggest a rise in the
importance of state law, both as it might impact enforcement of federal
environmental programs and as a source of independent environmental
remedies. As an example of the former, the court narrowed the extent
to which the absence of a state-level program to implement the federal
Clean Water Act's permit requirement shields a member of the regulated
community from the obligation to obtain a permit. As an example of the
latter, the court affirmed an award of $4,350,000 in punitive damages
on a common-law nuisance theory in a case in which the actual damages
totaled only $47,000 and the administrative penalties under the stateenforced clean water regulations totaled only $10,000.
As with earlier environmental law survey articles,' this Article will
* Partner in the firm of Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Environmental and Natural
Resources Section, Atlanta, Georgia. University of the South (B.A., 1984); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1990). Member, Mercer Law Review
(1988-90).
** Associate in the firm of Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Environmental and Natural
Resources Section, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Illinois (B.S., 1995); University of
Florida, Levin College of Law (J.D., with high honors, 1998). Florida Journal of
International Law, Executive Student Works Editor (1997), Executive Articles Editor
(1998).
1. See W. Scott Laseter & Julie V. Mayfield, Environmental Law, 50 MERCER L. REV.
1005 (1999); W. Scott Laseter & Julie V. Mayfield, EnvironmentalLaw, 49 MERCER L. REV.
1007 (1998); W. Scott Laseter & Julie V. Mayfield, EnvironmentalLaw, 48 MERCER L. REV.
1577 (1997); W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1359 (1995);
Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1187
(1993); Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 42 MERCER L. REV.
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not review basic statutory schemes unless the Eleventh Circuit has not
previously interpreted the statute in question. For readers seeking
background on the law, a brief overview of those statutes can be found
in earlier survey articles.
II.

DISCUSSION

Clean Water Act: The Zero-DischargeRule
Under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 2 the discharge of any pollutant
into waters of the United States is prohibited unless allowed by a permit
under the National Pollutate Discharge Elimination System

A.

("NPDES). 3 "Pollutant" is defined broadly and includes "rock, sand,

cellar dirt and industrial ... waste."4 This strict-liability scheme is
known as the "zero-discharge" rule.
1. The Hughey Exception Re-Examined: Driscoll v. Adams.
The Eleventh Circuit had occasion to address several CWA issues in
1999. In Driscoll v. Adams,5 the court took the opportunity to revisit its
1996 decision in Hughey v. JMS Development Corp.,' which exempted
from the permit requirement discharges of stormwater runoff generated
by construction activities when no approved program for issuing the
applicable permit exists and the discharger makes a good-faith effort to
comply with all other regulations. 7
In Driscoll plaintiffs sued their adjoining property owner under the
CWA's citizen suit provision, alleging that during timber-harvesting and
road-building operations defendant allowed sediment-laden stormwater
to flow across his property and wash into ponds and waterways on
plaintiffs' properties. As part of his operation, defendant built culverts,
check dams, and other devices to channel stormwater runoff from his
property and divided his property for development. Defendant conceded,
however, that these efforts did not prevent erosion of mud, sand, and
other debris from his property onto his neighbors' property'

1411 (1991).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).

3. Id. § 1311(a).
4.

40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1999).

5.
6.
7.
8.

181 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1961 (2000).
78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1530.
181 F.3d at 1287.
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Defendant also failed to obtain any federal, state, or local permits or
other approvals before starting his development activities.9 In fact, he
first filed for a required state permit a year after commencement of his
operation and first obtained a county development permit two years
after commencement.10 Moreover, defendant never sought a NPDES
permit, which is the only means of authorizing discharges of pollution
into waters of the United States under the CWA, and he violated the
CWA's prohibition on "'the discharge of any pollutant by any person'"
into the waters of the United States without a permit. 1 However, as
in Hughey, the State of Georgia had neither issued a general permit nor
developed a program providing for individual permits. 2 In following
Hughey, the district court held that compliance with the CWA's
requirements was impossible and granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment.' 3
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court, holding that
the district judge had read the opinion in Hughey too broadly. 4 In
Hughey a plaintiff living downstream from a construction project sued
a developer to enjoin it from discharging stormwater runoff into a
tributary of the Yellow River, which ran adjacent to plaintiff's property. 5 As in Driscoll, no general stormwater permit for construction
activities was available to defendant in Hughey." Unlike defendant in
Driscoll, however, defendant in Hughey did "everything possible to
comply with the legal requirements of building a small residential
subdivision."' Defendant hired consulting engineers, installed state-ofthe-art sedimentation control devices that exceeded Gwinnett County's
requirements, and complied with Georgia's Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Control Act of 1975 ("SESCA").' s
In Hughey the Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiff's citizen-suit claim
because "Congress could not have intended a strict application of the

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1287-88 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)).
12. Id. at 1288.
13. Id. at 1287.
14. Id. at 1290-91. The court in Driscoll also reaffirmed the expansive definitions of
the terms "pollutant," "point source," and "navigable waters" applied in the context of the
CWA. Id. Because the court merely reaffirmed what had appeared to be settled law, this
Article will not discuss these holdings. See United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 134143 (1 th Cir. 1997) (discussing the broad definitions of "navigable waters" and "pollutant").
15. 78 F.3d at 1527.
16. Id. at 1526.
17. Id.

18. Id. at 1526 & n.3. SESCA is located at O.C.G.A §§ 12-7-1 to -18 (1996).
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zero discharge standard in Section 1311(a) when compliance is factually
impossible." 9 Stating that "whenever it rained in Gwinnett County
some discharge was going to occur; nothing [defendant] could do would
prevent all rain water discharge," the court refused to penalize a
developer that "made every good-faith effort to comply with the Clean
Water Act and all other relevant pollution control standards."20 The
court relied heavily on the fact that defendant had complied with
SESCA's requirements and that the proposed Georgia general NPDES
stormwater permit required "permitees to perform certain erosion and
sedimentation control practices" identical to those then required by
SESCA. 2 1 Thus, under Hughey, if (1) compliance with a zero-discharge
standard under the CWA is factually impossible, such as in the context
of stormwater runoff; (2) no NPDES permit exists to cover such
discharge; (3) the discharger was in good-faith compliance with local
requirements that are substantially similar to the proposed NPDES
standards; and (4) the discharges are minimal, then the discharger is not
subject to a citizen suit under the CWA.22
In contrast to the defendant in Hughey, the court in Driscoll found
that defendant had failed make a good-faith effort to comply with the
CWA or relevant pollution control standards.2 3 Moreover, plaintiffs
proved that the discharges from defendant's property were not minimal
by showing the operation resulted in the deposit of approximately sixtyfour tons of sediment into plaintiffs' ponds.24 Because the facts in
Driscoll did not square with the facts in Hughey, the court refused to
relax the CWA's zero-discharge rule any further.25
While the court preserved the narrow Hughey exception to the general
rule of no discharge without a permit, it noted that its decision was
consistent with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Sierra Club, Lone Star
Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co.2" The court in Cedar Point held that
when the issuing authority has not issued a NPDES permit, the CWA
prohibits all discharges of pollutants.27 In that case, the Sierra Club
sued an oil producer for unlawful discharge of "produced water" into
Galveston Bay.2" Because the EPA had not issued an applicable permit

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1530.
Id.
Id.
Id.

23.

181 F.3d at 1289; see also supra text accompanying notes 8-11.

24. 181 F.3d at 1289.
25. Id. at 1290.
26. Id. (citing 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996)).

27. 73 F.3d at 562.
28. Id. at 551, 553.
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under the NPDES, Cedar Point argued that it could not have violated an
effluent limitation or permit condition under the CWA.29 The Fifth
Circuit rejected this argument because it found that Congress had built
in a grace period for noncompliance with effluent standards or permits,
which had expired on July 1, 1973, so that the EPA would have time to
issue permits.3 0 The court interpreted Congress's failure to extend the
grace period beyond July 1, 1973, even in light of the EPA's failure to
issue certain permits, as evidence of Congress's intent to apply the strict
zero-discharge standard."1
Thus, the Fifth Circuit determined that the CWA allows no exception
to its prohibition on unpermitted discharge of pollutants into the waters
of the United States, even when the EPA has not issued an NPDES
permit.32 The Eleventh Circuit in Hughey was ambiguous as to
whether the exception it carved out should be applied to nonstormwater
permits.33 However, by citing Cedar Point in Driscoll, it is possible
that the Eleventh Circuit opened the door to an argument that the
Hughey exception can be applied in nonstormwater cases when the
Hughey factors are satisfied. Thus, in Driscoll the Eleventh Circuit
reinforced the general rule that, except under facts that closely align
with those in Hughey, the lack of an applicable NPDES permit is no
defense to a citizen suit under the CWA.34
2. Sierra Club v. Georgia Power Co.: A Public Policy Limitation on Remedies for Violation of Effluent Limitations. While the
decision in Driscollmight be read as narrowing the potential breadth of
the Hughey exception, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Sierra Club v.
Georgia Power Co. 5 may have created another modest exception to the
zero-discharge limitation. In Georgia Power the court affirmed the
district court's denial of a preliminary injunction mandating an
immediate end to violations of the CWA against the operator of a power
plant.3' Georgia Power operated a plant on the banks of Lake Sinclair
that was authorized to discharge heated wastewater into the lake under

29. Id. at 559.
30. Id. at 560 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(1)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 562.
33. Compare Hughey, 78 F.3d at 1530 ("The facts of this case necessarily limit our
holding to situations in which the stormwater discharge is minimal."), with id. (recounting

the Hughey factors, including when "no NPDES permit covering such discharge exists,"
with no mention of a requirement that the discharge limitation apply only to stormwater).

34. 181 F.3d at 1290.
35. 180 F.3d 1309 (lth Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
36. Id. at 1310-11.
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the conditions of a NPDES permit. During a particularly hot summer,
the plant exceeded this effluent limitation and the Sierra Club brought
suit to enjoin further violations.3 7
The Sierra Club contended that this thermal loading resulted in fish
kills and undermined lakeside residents' enjoyment of the lake. Georgia
Power responded that it simply could not achieve the permit requirements without impacting the level of power generated throughout its
entire system.3" The district court agreed with Georgia Power following
an evidentiary hearing, concluding "that the potential harm to the
general public from a reduction of electrical power or thermal loading
into the lake, outweighed the potential injury to lakeside residents if the
plant continued to operate at its current output pendente lite."39
In affirming the trial court, the Eleventh Circuit noted that an
appellate court should disturb the district court's findings "only if the
district court abused its discretion" with respect to the denial or grant
of a preliminary injunction.4 ° The court found that Georgia Power had
supplied ample evidence to show the grant of a preliminary injunction
would be adverse to the general public's interest.41 The court also
found that reducing the power supplied during the hottest months of the
year could injure the public welfare.4 2 For example, during the hottest
days of summer, supplying power for air conditioning to day-care
centers, hospitals, and nursing homes was of prime importance.4 3
Georgia Power also produced evidence showing that the fish kills
because of excessive thermal loading were rare and only a temporary
problem." Because Georgia Power showed that the injunction would
disserve the public interest, the court upheld the trial court's decision.45
The reach of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion is unclear because the case
involved only the question of whether to grant a preliminary injunction.
However, because Georgia Power essentially stipulated that it violated

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1310.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Crochet v. Housing Auth. of Tampa, 37 F.3d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 1994)).
Id.
Id. at 1311.
Id.
Id. at 1310-11.
Id. at 1311.

In order to prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction, the movant has the
burden of proving: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a
substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) its own injury outweighs the injury to
the nonmovant; and (4) the injunction would not disserve the public interest.
Haitian Refugee Ctr, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(emphasis added).
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its effluent limitation, the decision suggests a willingness to tolerate
some degree of temporary noncompliance in the face of public necessity.
B. Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation, and
Liability Act
In Canadyne-GeorgiaCorp. v. NationsBank, NA. (South)," the court
considered the relatively new fiduciary liability provision of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act ("CERCLA). 47 In Canadyne the former owner of a site where a
pesticide plant was located filed suit under CERCLA and the Georgia
Hazardous Site Response Act ("HSRA) 4' against, among others, the
current and former trustees of a trust that held a general partnership
interest.4 9 NationsBank, a former trustee of the trust that was a
general partner, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was neither
an owner nor an operator of the site under CERCLA.5 °
The district court agreed that NationsBank was not a "covered person"
under CERCLA and granted NationsBank's motion to dismiss. 5' Citing
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Redwing Carriers,Inc. v. Saraland
Apartments,5 2 the trial court reasoned that state law governed whether
a person was an "owner" of property within the meaning of CERCLA.53
The district court found that under the applicable Georgia limited
partnership statute, the individual partners owned partnership property
as tenants in common, and thus NationsBank held legal title to the
property.5 4 However, the court also noted that "'where a general
partner is such in his representative capacity, only the person represented-that is, the principal, trust or estate-is liable for partnership
debts.'"5 5 Then, looking to Georgia trustee liability cases, the court
noted that when a trustee is operating a business according to testamentary design, the trustee's liability for torts committed in the course of the
business is limited to the trustee's representative capacity, rather than

46. 183 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
48. O.C.G.A. §§ 12-8-90 to -113 (1996 & Supp. 1999).
49. Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A. (South), 982 F. Supp. 886, 888, 891
(M.D. Ga. 1997).
50. Id. at 887-88.
51. Id. at 891.
52. 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996).
53. 982 F. Supp. at 888. The trial court's reasoning also comports with the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63-64 (1998).
54. 982 F. Supp. at 888 (citing Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 178 S.E.2d 198, 200 (Ga.

1970)).
55. Id. at 889 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-9-101 cmt. (1994)).
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direct individual liability.5" By this path the trial court reached the
conclusion that "Georgia trust law prohibited [NationsBank's] liability
for the obligations of the partnership" and found that it could not hold
the trustee liable as an "owner" of the facility.5 7 The district court also
rejected Canadyne's argument that NationsBank was an "operator" of
the facility because Canadyne's bare allegation that the bank was an
operator was not specific enough to survive a motion to dismiss.58
Because the trial court found that the bank was neither an owner nor
an operator, it did not reach NationsBank's defense under the Asset
Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act. 59
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
remanded the case, holding that NationsBank was indeed an owner of
the site and that the district court prematurely dismissed the action."
In reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit first assessed
whether the bank was an owner under CERCLA.6 ' As a threshold
matter, the court agreed that state law governed whether a person
should be considered an owner of property.62 However, applying state
law, the Eleventh Circuit found that "[e]ven though [NationsBank]
technically held its WCW general partnership interest in trust, under
Georgia law, [NationsBank] held legal title to and therefore owned the
general partnership interest. [NationsBank] therefore owned whatever
property the general partners of [the partnership] owned."63 The court
did not directly address the district judge's holding that if a trustee is
not personally liable for the obligations of the trust, the trustee is not an
owner. However, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Redwing Carriers
may be instructive in advising that "[u]ltimately, federal law determines
Thus, though state law controls
the issue of CERCLA liability."'
whether a particular person is an owner of a facility,65 whether that

56. Id. (citing Beaudry, Inc. v. Freeman, 38 S.E.2d 40, 48 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946)).
57. Id. at 890.
58. Id. at 890-91. The court stated that Canadyne's bare allegation, without providing
more specific examples of when NationsBank "'play[ed] an active role in the actual
management of the enterprise,'" was inadequate. Id. at 890 (quoting Jacksonville Elec.
Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993)).
59. 183 F.3d at 1272 n.2.
60. Id. at 1273, 1276.
61. Id. at 1272.
62. Id. at 1273.

63. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-12-2(11) (1997)).
64. 94 F.3d at 1500.
65. Id. at 1498.
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person is liable because of the condition of ownership is wholly dictated
by CERCLA."
The court noted that its analysis could not end with a finding that
NationsBank was a potentially liable party as an owner because
NationsBank claimed exemption from liability under the Asset
Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act
("ACLLDIPA").67 According to the bank, the ACLLDIPA barred
personal liability because "'[tihe liability of a fiduciary under any
provision of [CERCLA] for the release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance at, from, or in connection with a vessel or facility
held in a fiduciary capacity shall not exceed the assets held in the
fiduciary capacity.'" 68 Barring application of a statutory exception,
"fiduciaries, even those who might otherwise be deemed 'owners' under
§ 107(a), generally cannot be held personally liable under CERCLA." 9
However, Canadyne asserted that the exception for negligence of a
fiduciary should apply to NationsBank's relationship to the limited
partnership.7 ° That provision precludes the application of the fiduciary
rule when the "'negligence of a fiduciary causes or contributes to the release'" of a hazardous substance. 7' Although the court noted that "to
survive summary judgment, much less to prevail, Canadyne must do
more than just utter the word 'negligence,'" it found that the bare
72
allegation of negligence was enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Significantly, in reaching its holding on the motion to dismiss, the
court placed two conditions on the application of the exception for
negligent conduct by a fiduciary. 73 First, the court held that to invoke
the exception, a plaintiff must show that the fiduciary "took particular
negligent actions that caused or contributed to the release of hazardous
substances."74 Second, the court noted the fiduciary must have
performed some discrete negligent act because CERCLA does not impose

66. Id. at 1500; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) ("Notwithstanding any other provision or
rule of law .... ").
67. 183 F.3d at 1274.
68. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n)(1)).
69. Id. at 1274-75.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1274 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n)(3)).
72. Id. at 1275-76.
73. Id. at 1275.
74. Id. This is similar to the rule adopted in Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales
& Services, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1367-68 (M.D. Ga. 1998), but it appears to provide
a more focused inquiry. See also Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shulimson Bros., 1 F. Supp. 2d 553, 557
(W.D.N.C. 1998).
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a duty to act.75 Thus, the fiduciary cannot be liable for negligence in
failing to prevent pollution.78
C.

NationalForest Management Act

The Eleventh Circuit also ruled on a challenge brought under the
National Forest Management Act ("NFMA) 77 by the Sierra Club to
agency approval of seven timber cutting projects in Georgia's Chattahoochee National Forest.7" The NFMA and regulations promulgated
thereunder require the Forest Service to adopt a Land and Resource
Management Plan ("Forest Plan").79 The NFMA requires all permits
and contracts for the use of the National Forests to be consistent with
the Forest Plans. ° The Forest Plan for the Chattahoochee National
Forest required that the Forest Service gather and consider population
inventory data before issuing any decision affecting areas within the
forest.8 ' The regulations require that the Forest Service "provide for
diversity of plant and animal communities" by, in part, gathering and
keeping data on species diversity.82 Such "[ilnventories shall include
quantitative data making possible the evaluation of diversity in terms
The Forest Service must also
of its prior and present condition."'
monitor the population of management indicator species ("MIS"). 84
Specifically, the Forest Service is required to select certain species as
MIS and monitor those species' populations and determine their
relationship to habitat changes.85
In Martin, after conducting an environmental assessment of the
proposed logging activities in the Chattahoochee National Forest, the
Forest Service issued a finding of no significant impact on the forest and
approved the activities. The Sierra Club challenged these findings and
the Forest Service's subsequent approval of the activities, asserting that
the Forest Service did not consider population inventory and trend data
for endangered or threatened species ("PETS") as the Forest Plan
required. The Sierra Club also contended that the decision did not
adequately protect the forest's watershed, fish and wildlife. Thus,

75. 183 F.3d at 1275.
76. Id.
77.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1994 & Supp. lV 1998).

78. Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1 (11th Cir. 1999).
79. Id. at 2 n.2 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a)).
80. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (1994)).

81. Id. at 3.
82. 35 C.F.R. § 219.26 (1999).

83. Id.
84. Id. § 219.19(a)(1) (1999).

85. Id.
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according to the Sierra Club, the Forest Service's decision violated the
NFMA and the Forest Plan.8 6
In challenging the Forest Service's approval of the projects under the
regulations promulgated pursuant to the NFMA, 7 the Sierra Club also
argued that harmonization of Section 219.26 and Section 219.19 required
the Forest Service to maintain population data on all affected MIS in a
planning area.'
Because the Forest Service lacked quantitative
inventory data on many MIS, and the data it did have indicated that the
species were declining, the Sierra Club argued that the agency's
approval of the projects was arbitrary and capricious.8" The Forest
Service countered that neither Section 219.19 nor Section 219.26 applies
at the site-specific level, but only to the formulation of the Forest
Plan.' Moreover, because the Forest Plan is not a final agency action
under the Administrative Procedure Act, the agency argued that it was
not reviewable. 9'
The district court granted summary judgment for the Forest Service,
ruling that the Forest Service was not required to consider PETS
population data prior to the approvals and that the regulations did not
deal with site-specific actions, but with the formulation of Forest Plans.
On appeal the Sierra Club sought a ruling that the NFMA requires
consideration of PETS data prior to approval of forest activities and that
the regulations applied to site-specific actions under existing Forest
Plans.92
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court on both issues and
remanded the case.93 With respect to the PETS population and trend
data, the court noted that both parties agreed that the habitat in
sections of the project areas was suitable for sensitive species. 9' Based
on this fact, the Sierra Club argued that the Forest Service was required
by its own Forest Plan to gather population data before permitting
timber harvesting. 95 The Forest Service responded that its data was
adequate and that population studies were required by the Forest Plan
only if the habitat had a high potential for occupancy by PETS.' The

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

168 F.3d at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5-7.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 4.

95. Id.
96. Id.
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Forest Service also contended that it had the discretion to make
determinations of potential impact.97
Outlining the standard of review, the Eleventh Circuit explained that
while agency interpretations of their own regulations are afforded great
deference, "'courts must overturn agency actions which do not scrupulously follow the regulations and procedures promulgated by the agency
itself.'" 98 The court explained, "Agency actions must be reversed as
arbitrary and capricious when the agency fails to examine the relevant
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made."99
The Forest Service conceded that PETS occurred in numerous places
within the project boundaries, but approved the project
without gathering any inventory or population data on many of the
PETS species. Though these species are, by definition, at risk, nothing
in the record indicates that the Forest Service possessed baseline
population data from which to measure the impact that their destruction in the project areas would have on the overall forest population. 00
The Forest Plan required the Forest Service to gather population and
trend data for PETS species in the path of a project when adequate
population inventory information was unavailable.' °' Although the
Forest Service argued that it had adequate information, the court found
that it really had "no information at all in terms of many of the PETS
species."0 2 Therefore, the court held that "the Forest Service's failure
to gather population inventory data on the PETS species occurring or
with a high potential to occur within the project areas [was] contrary to
the Forest Plan," and, consequently, the Forest Service's subsequent
approval of the timber projects was arbitrary and capricious. °3
Regarding the MIS claims, the court again found for the Sierra Club,
holding that the obligations of the Forest Service do not end upon
approval of a Forest Plan, but rather require compliance with its
provisions when reviewing site-specific actions.'O° Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the Forest Service has a continuing obligation to gather

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. (quoting Simmons v. Block, 782 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1986)).
Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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MIS inventory data." 5 The court ruled that the two regulations
require the Forest Service to use the MIS data to measure the impact of
habitat changes on the forest's diversity."°
III.

CONCLUSION

Trends in environmental law, like most other areas of practice, are
almost impossible to spot other than by hindsight. However, a person
wishing to speculate on future areas of activity might take note of the
Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Johansen v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.10 7 That factually unremarkable case involved the owner of a
former mine site who allowed acidic water to escape from the site and
enter plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs brought a lawsuit asserting common-law
nuisance and trespass claims. Although it awarded only $47,000 in
actual damages and the Georgia Environmental Protection Division
assessed only $10,000 in statutory fines, the federal jury initially
awarded more than $45 million in punitive damages."0 8 Following one
trip all the way to the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit eventually'
approved $4,350,000 in punitive damages.109
Although overshadowed by statutory titans like CERCLA and the
CWA, most regular practitioners in the environmental arena know that
common-law remedies have played significant roles in the development
of environmental law since its inception. The federal courts' blessing of
significant punitive damages awards may signal the beginning of a new
era in environmental enforcement in which common-law theories reemerge to drive resolution of environmental disputes.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
170 F.3d 1320 (1999).
Id. at 1326-27.
Id. at 1327, 1339.
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